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BOOK REVIEWS
kamari maxine Clarke, Fictions 
oF Justice: the international 
criminal court and the 
challenge oF legal Pluralism in 
sub-saharan aFrica (CamBriDge 
univerSity preSS 2009)
Over the past two decades, the response 
to violence in sub-Saharan Africa has been 
to hold the perpetrators accountable in 
international or internationalized tribunals. 
Indicative of this phenomenon is that all 
four of the situations that the Office of 
the Prosecutor of the International Crimi-
nal Court (ICC) is currently investigating 
involve armed conflict situations in states 
in sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, the ICC 
Prosecutor’s recent application to the ICC 
to initiate an investigation into a fifth 
situation concerns crimes committed in the 
course of post-election unrest in Kenya. 
The overwhelming attention that the ICC 
has given to situations in sub-Saharan 
Africa makes Kamari Maxine Clarke’s 
book Fictions of Justice1 a timely exposé 
on why Africa has seemingly become the 
experimental ground for the new system of 
international justice and what difficulties 
lie in the attempt to achieve legal pluralism 
on the continent.
In Fictions of Justice, Clarke challenges 
conventionally accepted Western notions 
of the victim, perpetrator, and appropri-
ate justice mechanisms for sub-Saharan 
Africa. Part I of Clarke’s book uses case 
studies from the International Criminal 
Court’s case against Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo and traditional justice practices in 
Northern Uganda to illustrate an example 
of and challenge to liberalist notions of jus-
tice. Part II uses several case studies from 
the Islamic Sharia penal system in Nigeria 
to illustrate that strict Islamic legal norms 
have re-emerged that do not neatly fit the 
international criminal law mold. Clarke 
theorizes that international jurists, NGOs, 
and donors have worked together to con-
struct specific concepts of the African vic-
tim and perpetrator that further the ICC’s 
command responsibility-centered approach 
to justice and hinder legal pluralism in 
Islamic societies.
Clarke suggests that these international 
actors can more easily justify their involve-
ment in the affairs of African states if their 
efforts are in the name of universalism 
and directed at punishing “barbaric Mus-
lims” in Nigeria or warlords in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo (DRC) who force 
“child soldiers” to commit heinous crimes. 
Clarke’s theory points out the inability or 
unwillingness of those who champion the 
international legal and human rights regime 
to address the root causes and dynamics of 
violence in sub-Saharan Africa. Among 
the issues undergirding the violence are: 
the reasons, apart from abduction, why 
children become involved in conflicts; the 
way that access to resources and spheres of 
political power often initiate or fuel armed 
conflicts on the continent; and the legal and 
moral obligation felt by many Muslims to 
maintain the integrity of Islam.
By simplifying the perpetrator of “Afri-
can violence” to an adult rebel commander 
or radical Islam as a whole, the interna-
tional human rights regime can more easily 
reinforce its own premise that Africans are 
helpless to mete out justice themselves. 
Thus aptly titled, Fictions of Justice high-
lights the process through which the insti-
tutions and NGOs that have mobilized 
in the justice-making process attempt to 
compartmentalize and manage “African 
violence” on behalf of African states.
At first glance, Clarke’s theory appears 
flawed because the ICC Prosecutor’s cases 
concerning the situations in northern 
Uganda, the DRC, and the Central African 
Republic came about because the states 
themselves referred the situations to the 
ICC Prosecutor for investigation. However, 
Clarke carefully explains how the global 
NGO movement creates epistemic com-
munities of local civil society actors who 
proliferate liberalist human rights language 
and advocate for international criminal 
justice.
By utilizing case studies from Uganda 
and Nigeria, Fictions of Justice shrewdly 
illustrates the danger of having those who 
are removed from the affected community 
monopolize justice processes that do not 
take into account the affected commu-
nity’s own conceptions of justice. In the 
Acholi sub-region of Northern Uganda, for 
example, emphasis is placed on restorative 
justice than on retributive justice. Clarke 
asserts that traditional justice and clan 
reconciliation practices in Acholi challenge 
the international criminal law structure 
because they give the victim a voice and 
direct participation as a political being in 
the justice process. Therefore, proponents 
of international justice would even be 
skeptical of traditional justice operating 
alongside the ICC proceedings. Clarke 
emphasizes that, by simplifying the Afri-
can victim to an apolitical figure who is 
only concerned with basic survival needs 
and confining victims’ participation to that 
which is done through a representative, 
the ICC creates the “ghost victim.”2 The 
victims’ plight and evidence of the crimes 
themselves become overshadowed by a 
quest to prove the command responsibility 
of a single individual.
Clarke analyzes the Amina Lawal case 
in Nigeria to demonstrate how interna-
tional NGOs galvanized global support for 
their campaign against what they incor-
rectly and often prejudicially characterized 
as the imminent death by stoning of a 
woman in a barbaric and ancient Islamic 
law system in Nigeria. Considering that 
Western audiences view stoning through 
Judeo-Christian biblical imagery, the 
Amina Lawal case study vividly illustrates 
how international NGOs have the potential 
to hyperbolize injustice in Africa. In other 
words, they can further their own advocacy 
agendas by feeding into pre-existing ideas 
about justice and misconceptions of non-
Western, non-adversarial proceedings.
Fictions of Justice poses relevant ques-
tions about who determines that a certain 
type of violence is “just” while others 
deserve punishment. Her criticism is not 
aimed merely at international actors, but 
also at domestic actors who use religion or 
appeals to traditional justice to oppose lib-
eralist or international influence. Although 
Clarke adopts Nigerian human rights law-
yer Hauwa Ibrahim’s position that legal 
reform is needed in both the Islamic and 
secular spheres in Nigeria, Clarke fails to 
detail exactly how those reforms would 
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take shape. Particularly when reformers 
would be working with the same interna-
tional institutions that have dictated the 
“justice” vernacular up to this point, why 
would donors not also dictate the educa-
tion of judges, court officials, and police 
officers, or advocate a Westernized reform 
of the Sharia Penal Code?
As donor funding moves increasingly 
from directly supporting states to funding 
African NGOs, Fictions of Justice calls for 
domestic and international actors to look 
beyond merely “sensitizing” local com-
munities to support justice mechanisms 
that assign criminal responsibility based 
on liberalist human rights notions, and 
instead empower local populations to par-
ticipate in the political processes that shape 
international criminal legal institutions and 
non-secular legal institutions.
Eleanor Thompson, a J.D. candidate at the 
Washington College of Law, reviewed Fic-
tions of Justice for the Human Rights 
Brief. Prior to law school, Thompson 
worked with war-affected communities in 
northern Uganda and with the Coalition 
for the International Criminal Court on 
international justice campaigns in sub-
Saharan Africa. 
states oF Violence: War, caPital 
Punishment, and letting die 
(auStin Sarat & Jennifer 
l. CulBert eDS., CamBriDge 
univerSity preSS 2009)
In States of Violence: War, Capital Pun-
ishment, and Letting Die,3 Austin Sarat and 
Jennifer L. Culbert present scholarship on 
three areas of state violence: war, capital 
punishment, and the act of letting die. 
Their exploration rests on a fundamental 
philosophical analysis of the functioning 
and purpose of the state’s use or threat of 
violence. Sarat and Culbert’s thesis is that, 
because the state is by necessity inherently 
violent, its violent acts may not be so eas-
ily challenged as many critics suspect. Put 
another way, a state must threaten its citi-
zens with actual or implied force in order 
to exist. Because the state is by nature 
violent, determining when it has abused 
its license is often more complicated than 
simply identifying violence.
To do this, Sarat and Culbert establish 
violence as inherent to the existence of 
the state through a deeply philosophical 
discussion of social contract theory. They 
rely most notably on Thomas Hobbes to 
explain the state’s need to keep “all in 
awe.”4 In The Leviathan, Hobbes contrasts 
the “state of nature” — complete freedom 
and condition of war — with the creation 
of the state, requiring individuals to sac-
rifice certain freedoms in the name of 
greater security. The source of that security 
is the overwhelming power of the state to 
destroy any who challenge its rules. Thus, 
Sarat and Culbert conclude that violence 
is “intimately connected with ideas of 
sovereignty.”5
By bringing together essays on the 
diverse forms of state violence, Sarat and 
Culbert complicate the concept of state 
violence and include within it actions that 
appear justified or even nonviolent. From 
the Iraq War to capital punishment and the 
abrogation of indigenous rights, each of the 
eleven essays in States of Violence presents 
an example of state violence connected 
with seemingly non-violent state action. 
The essays then explore how the state’s 
violence is couched in nonviolent action 
or justified as the prevention of greater 
violence: the Iraq War was billed as a “pre-
emptive strike” in the name of defense; 
capital punishment is justified as crime 
prevention; and the destruction of indig-
enous identity is often the result of treaties 
alleging to create indigenous rights.
While each of the essays carefully pres-
ents the acts of violence and the victims 
themselves as textured and nuanced, the 
state is often portrayed as a homogenous, 
one-dimensional entity with little complex-
ity. This imbalance makes it difficult to 
apply the concept of the inherently violent 
state to the real world. Such a philosophical 
concept may be difficult to use directly as 
a foundation for any criticism of state vio-
lence. Nevertheless, it may still inform the 
discourse on the proper limits of state vio-
lence. It seems likely that this is the project 
that Sarat and Culbert mean to undertake, 
because at no point does the book suggest 
that the inherently violent state should be 
free from critique.
The essays in States of Violence are 
divided into two sections. The first section, 
entitled “On the Forms of State Killing,” 
explores the various ways that state vio-
lence manifests itself throughout the world, 
and the second, “Investigating the Dis-
course of Death,” looks specifically at cap-
ital punishment as a form of state violence. 
The following synopses highlight several 
different forms of state violence addressed 
in the book and provide a glimpse of the 
implications of Sarat and Culbert’s thesis 
in action.
The first section begins with an essay 
by Robin Wagner-Pacifici entitled “The 
Innocuousness of State Lethality in an 
Age of National Security.” Wagner-Pacifici 
analyzes “documents of state” and the use 
of war as a “variation on a theme of lethal-
ity” within the context of the U.S. “War 
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on Terror.”6 Through a close examination 
of the George W. Bush administration’s 
National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America for 2002 and 2006, as 
well as the 2005 National Strategy for Vic-
tory in Iraq, Wagner-Pacifici constructs 
an image of U.S. foreign policy as an 
offensive strategy disguised as a defensive 
one. Further, Wagner-Pacifici illustrates 
how the rhetoric used in these documents 
is specifically crafted to legitimize the use 
of force against other nations by describing 
it as necessary pre-emptive defense action.
In “Due Process and Lethal Confine-
ment,” Colin Dayan parallels the “legal 
death” of detainees caught outside any 
clear legal establishment with the absence 
of due process for suspected gang mem-
bers in U.S. prisons. Dayan specifically 
examines the U.S. Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, and the later 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Boume-
diene v. Bush. Dylan makes tangible the 
tension between the Court’s rulings and the 
efforts of the George W. Bush administra-
tion to maintain the detainees at Guanta-
namo and other detention facilities around 
the world as stateless and rightless “illegal 
enemy combatants.” In poignant contrast, 
Dayan explores the lack of due process for 
inmates determined to be gang members 
when they are placed in solitary confine-
ment in Arizona prisons. Both groups, he 
contends, exist in a world where they have 
lost their “right to have rights.”7
In the first section’s final piece, Mark 
Antaki and Coel Kirby discuss the destruc-
tive effects of the Canadian government’s 
recognition of indigenous peoples in “The 
Lethality of the Canadian State’s (Re)
cognition of Indigenous Peoples.” Kirby 
and Antaki argue that the state’s recogni-
tion of an indigenous people as a legally 
cognizable group is an integral part of the 
process that destroys them as a separate 
people. Because Canada’s legal recogni-
tion of indigenous people has consistently 
required their submission to Canadian 
authority, the very act of gaining legal 
identity is the first step towards losing 
indigenous cultural identity. Kirby and 
Antaki argue this shows that state violence 
need not be physical in form, but that “[b]
y its very sight and speech, the state kills 
people as peoples.”8
The second section begins with “Death 
in the First Person” by Peter Brooks. 
Brooks’s essay explores author Victor 
Hugo’s effort to humanize the act of execu-
tion by telling it through the eyes of 
the condemned in Le Dernier Jour d’un 
Condamné. Brooks seeks to demonstrate 
the importance of narrative in understand-
ing the death penalty. Rather than focusing 
on the moral or ideological underpinnings 
of the death penalty, Brooks suggests that 
something valuable can be gained by look-
ing at the story of the condemned and of 
execution itself.
In the third essay in this section, “Ethi-
cal Exception: Capital Punishment in the 
Figure of Sovereignty,” Adam Thurschwell 
seeks to illuminate the distinction between 
moral and political arguments against capi-
tal punishment. He argues that the politi-
cal-philosophical reasoning for the state’s 
right to kill its subjects is far more reveal-
ing of the real basis for the state’s authority 
to take life than the moral-philosophical 
arguments so often made. In particular, 
he notes that anti-abolitionists have effec-
tively argued that, because nearly every 
decision that states make involves some 
consequence of life or death to its citizens, 
capital punishment should not be singled 
out for abolition. Thurschwell does not put 
forth an argument for or against capital 
punishment, but rather aims to find the 
“issues that really matter today in the field 
of capital punishment . . . .”9 While not 
indicating which way this line of reason-
ing would move the moral-philosophical 
debate, Thurschwell makes a compelling 
argument for the incorporation of the polit-
ical-philosophical line of thought.
Through the varied examples of state 
violence that it explores, States of Violence 
succeeds in making the point that the rela-
tionship of the state to violence is less sus-
ceptible to critique than first appearance 
would suggest. The wide range of essays 
support the contention that this is not a lim-
ited thesis, but is rather applicable to the 
various forms of state violence. Implicit 
in this thesis is a challenge to the reader to 
incorporate the more informed understand-
ing of state violence into continued critique 
of that violence. Perhaps, with the knowl-
edge that the state is inherently violent, one 
can more effectively argue for how that 
violence can be toned and tempered. HRB
Evan Wilson, a J.D. candidate at the Wash-
ington College of Law, reviewed States of 
Violence for the Human Rights Brief.
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